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Abstract The “four principles approach” has been popu-
larly accepted as a set of universal guidelines for biomed-
ical ethics. Based on four allegedly trans-cultural principles
(respect for autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence and
justice), it is supposed to fulfil the need of a ‘culturally
neutral approach to thinking about ethical issues in health
care’. On the basis of a case-history, this paper challenges the
appropriateness of communicating in terms of these four
principles with patients with a different background. The
case describes the situation in which Muslim parents bring
forward that their religion keeps them from consenting to
end-of-life decisions by non-religious paediatricians. In a
literature analysis, the different meanings and roles of the
relevant principles in non-religious and Islamic ethics are
compared. In non-religious ethics, the principle of non-
maleficence may be used to justify withholding or with-
drawing futile or damaging treatments, whereas Islamic
ethics applies this principle to forbid all actions that may
harm life. And while the non-religious version of the
principle of respect for autonomy emphasises the need for
informed consent, the Islamic version focuses on “respect for
the patient”. We conclude that the parties involved in the
described disagreement may feel committed to seemingly
similar, but actually quite different principles. In such cases,
communication in terms of these principles may create a
conflict within an apparently common conceptual frame-
work. The four principles approach may be very helpful in
analysing ethical dilemmas, but when communicating with
patients with different backgrounds, an alternative approach
is needed that pays genuine attention to the different
backgrounds.
Keywords Ethics . Communication . Islam .
Intensive care unit, neonatal . Principle-based ethics
Introduction
Most decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining
treatment from (newborn) infants are made with mutual
consent of both physicians and parents [10, 15]. In the
context of the multiculturalism of most Western European
countries it is unlikely, however, that physicians and parents
will always hold the same values. They may have con-
flicting perceptions about which course of action is in the
best interest of the critically and incurably ill child.
The discussion and solution of these and similar disagree-
ments call for a bioethical approach that helps identifying
and evaluating the different arguments concerned. The four
principles approach, introduced by T.L. Beauchamp and J.F.
Childress in 1979 and promoted in Europe by R. Gillon,
seems the most promising candidate [2, 13]. It claims that
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‘whatever our personal philosophy, politics, religion, moral
theory, or life stance, we will find no difficulty in committing
ourselves to four prima facie moral principles’ [13]. These
four allegedly trans-cultural principles (respect for autono-
my, nonmaleficence, beneficence and justice) would offer
a common set of moral commitments, a common moral
language and a common set of moral issues. This then
would fulfil the need of a ‘culturally neutral approach to
thinking about ethical issues in health care’ [13]. The four
principles approach has often been criticised, e.g. because
conflicts between the four principles seem unsolvable,
since there is no unified moral theory from which they are
all derived [9]. Nevertheless, the approach has been
popularly accepted as a set of universal guidelines for
bioethics, especially in medical circles.
On the basis of a case-history (described in the case
report), this paper challenges the appropriateness of com-
municating in terms of these four principles with parents
with a different background. The case describes the situation
when Muslim parents bring forward that their religion
keeps them from consenting to end-of-life decisions of
non-religious paediatricians. In Western Europe, Muslims
form a large religious minority. The term “non-religious
ethics” is used to indicate forms of ethics not explicitly
based on religious texts or beliefs.
First we shall give a brief outline of the four principles
approach, often referred to as “principlism”. This same
paragraph will mirror the non-religious meanings and roles
of the principles. Subsequently, we will describe the different
meanings and roles of the principles in Islamic ethics. This
will reveal that the parties involved in the described
disagreement may feel committed to seemingly similar, but
actually quite different principles.
The four principles approach to biomedical ethics
The four principles approach is steeped in common
morality. This is, as Beauchamp and Childress put it, the
unphilosophical common sense and tradition shared gener-
ally by the members of a society. The common morality
comprises all and only those norms that all morally serious
persons accept as authoritative. By contrast, morality in the
community-specific sense includes the moral norms that
spring from particular cultural, religious, and institutional
sources [3]. Beauchamp and Childress accept the fact that
morality in the community-specific sense reflects signifi-
cant cultural differences, but also believe that a set of four
general principles, shared by everyone regardless of their
background, could form the basis of a culturally neutral
approach to bioethical issues [3].
One of these principles, justice, has little relevance for
the disagreement we focus on in this paper and we shall
therefore refrain from discussing it. Beauchamp and
Childress describe the three other principles as follows
[4–6].
Throughout the history of health care, the professional’s
obligations and virtues have been interpreted as commitments
of beneficence. This principle refers to actions performed
that contribute to the welfare of others. Traditionally
physicians were just “doing good”. It has become under-
stood, however, that acts of beneficence can conflict with the
requirement to respect a patient’s autonomy. This principle
refers to the individual’s self-determination, free from control
and influence by others. In the patient–physician relationship,
the patient’s autonomy is firstly based on informed consent
and refusal. If minors are involved, the child’s autonomy and
accessory rights are assigned to the parents. Some princip-
lists regard the principle of respect for autonomy as “first
among equals” [14].
The principle of nonmaleficence is closely related to
beneficence; it asserts an obligation not to inflict harm
intentionally. Beauchamp and Childress emphasise that when
medical treatment is futile or when its burdens outweigh the
benefits, the principle of nonmaleficence might justify or
sometimes even require withholding or withdrawing life-
sustaining procedures. Arguing that treatment occasionally
violates a patient’s interests, the principlists give considerable
weight to quality-of-life judgements.
Beauchamp and Childress consider the four principles
as “prima facie” rules, which means that they are non-
absolute: each of them is binding unless it conflicts with
another [3]. Conflicting principles call for careful “balanc-
ing and overriding”: the balancing of the respective weights
of the competing principles to determine one’s actual
obligations. “Specification” must be used to reduce the
abstractness of the principles; to provide them with action-
guiding content [3]. This process of specification is context-
related and may also be influenced by one’s particular
cultural or religious background, i.e. by one’s morality in
the community-specific sense. This means that the same
principle can be translated into various forms of actual
guidance. Moral justification proceeds from a “coherence
model” that provides principles for specific cases and
illuminates case analysis from general principles [7].
The four principles rooted in Islamic ethics
The Islamic tradition (The Qur’an, the sayings of prophet
Muhammed and the interpretative literature derived from
them) offers Muslims a guide for all aspects of life. The
main Islamic guiding principles are respect for human
dignity and the maintenance and protection of life, property
and honour. Several authors claim that the roots of the
four principles of Beauchamp and Childress are clearly
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identifiable in Islamic tradition as well [1, 17]. Van
Bommel suggests that these four principles even summa-
rise the Islamic norms of care and concern in medicine [8].
The way Beauchamp and Childress present the four
principles (as summarised above) mirrors certain aspects of
their own morality. Having a similar background as the
principlists, many non-religious Western European paedia-
tricians will attach the same meaning to these principles.
Some of these principles nevertheless appear to have
essentially different meanings in Islamic ethics.
Aksoy and Elmai, for example, demonstrate that Islamic
tradition offers many statements relating to the principle of
nonmaleficence, in the sense of refraining from doing harm
to others [1]. Refraining from treatment that might cause or
prolong harm, however, is generally not a topic in Islamic
medical ethics. Because of the unconditional valuation of
human life, every additional day lived is of value; a
treatment that prolongs life therefore cannot be harmful.
The trust in an omnipotent God is a second reason why
decisions to forgo life-prolonging treatments cannot be
justified. Van Bommel: ‘Muslims feel very strong that it is
Allah who does the actual healing, the doctor being only
the agent for the will of Allah. This consciousness is based
on the Qur’anic verse: “If Allah touch you with affliction,
none can remove it but He.” (6:17) [8]. Only incidentally a
Muslim scholar or a group of paediatricians will assert that
this does not necessarily rule out the possibility to refrain
from treatment [11, 16].
Aksoy and Elmai also give many instances in which
Islamic tradition shows respect for a patient’s autonomy [1].
Likewise, many Muslims defend the point of view that a
religious morality is not incompatible with human freedom
and responsibility [8, 12, 17]. ‘The Qu’ran puts its trust in
the rational power of human beings to distinguish between
truth and falsehood’, says Van Bommel [8]. Ebrahim
explains: ‘Reason was given to man so that he may be in a
position to freely accept the Law and obey Allah, or not to
do so at all.’; and ‘If he would not be free, the burden of
responsibility and morality would not have been placed upon
him [12].’
But does this Islamic autonomy authorise Muslims to
make their own decisions about life and death? Aksoy and
Elmai acknowledge that ‘absolute knowledge is predomi-
nant over individual autonomy [1].’ This view is endorsed
by Van Bommel: ‘For a Muslim patient, absolute autonomy
is very rare, there will be a feeling of responsibility towards
God, and he or she lives in a social coherence, in which
influences of the imam and relatives play their roles [8].’
Consequently, personal choices are only accepted if they
are the “right” ones. Questionable decisions that would be
acceptable according to the non-religious variant of respect
for autonomy, cannot be permitted according to the Islamic
variant. In such cases the Islamic notion of respect for the
patient requires to oppose the patient’s self-determination.
The emphasis is on beneficence over autonomy [1]. For in
protecting patients from making questionable choices, the
doctor shows respect for the patient as a person. Many non-
religious doctors would call this paternalism.
One could say that non-religious ethics applies the
principle of nonmaleficence to justify withholding or with-
drawing futile or damaging medical treatment, whereas in
Islamic ethics it is used to forbid all kind of actions or
omissions that may harm life. And while the non-religious
version of the principle of respect for autonomy emphasises
the need for informed consent, the Islamic version focuses on
the first part of the principle: respect.
Discussion
Clearly, the Muslim parents and non-religious paediatri-
cians who disagree on which course of action would be in
the best interest of their critically and incurably ill child
may feel committed to seemingly similar, but actually quite
different principles. The paediatricians may apply the
principle of nonmaleficence to justify withdrawing life-
sustaining treatment and may be convinced they need an
explicit consent for this from the parents in order to respect
their autonomy. The parents, however, do not consider the
extra days harm and trust their omnipotent God, which
keeps them from making decisions about life and death. In
such situations, communication in terms of these principles
may create a conflict (as described in the case-history)
within an apparently common conceptual framework. This
is not the legitimate agreement one might be looking for.
When paediatricians do not hold the same values as (the
parents of) their patients, an approach based on a search for
shared beliefs is in itself not impossible, as certain beliefs
can be justified from different outlooks on life. However,
when the difference in background between physicians and
patients is substantial, an alternative approach may be
needed that pays genuine attention to the different back-
grounds instead of putting them between brackets.
First of all, a more sophisticated terminology is required.
The non-religious paediatricians could for instance empha-
sise the “natural” character of the suggested path, rather
than explaining that they would like to “give the child the
chance to die”. This would leave some room for hope,
within the limits of what we as physicians can humanly do
for the child. In addition, it may often be necessary to
clarify expressions used, for some meanings, such as those
of “unnecessary suffering” and “quality of life”, are far
from universal. Sometimes it may be enough to realise that
differences do exist; being aware that some terms may be
interpreted differently is an important step in achieving
effective terminology when addressing parents.
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Secondly, caution is required regarding the explicitness and
time process of the desired consent. ManyWestern physicians
tend to involve patients and their families as much as possible
in the decision process, while Muslim parents believe that life
and death are decided by Allah only. Without challenging the
decision, Muslim parents sometimes declare that for religious
reasons explicit consent is not possible. It must be clear what
the options are in such situations. Regarding the time process,
it may be helpful to slow down the pace: if it seems difficult to
come to a consensus on a certain day, it may be possible after
one or two more days of reflection.
In our experience, the approach we put forward can even
result in consent to the proposed end-of-life decision. It
demands from paediatricians a sincere interest in the
differences between normative standpoints related to
cultural or religious beliefs and dedicated efforts to grasp
these. Undoubtedly this will not always lead to unanimity,
but a transparent disagreement would seem preferable to a
conflict situation.
Case report
A Turkish woman, mother of three healthy children, gave
birth to twins at 29 weeks’ gestational age. The second-
born twin was a girl with birth weight 945 g. Apgar scores
were 8 and 9 after 1 and 5 min, respectively. No abnormalities
were found at physical examination. The girl was admitted
on a level III neonatal intensive care unit.
After a mild respiratory distress syndrome (RDS), for
which treatment with continuous positive airway pressure
was initiated, she developed necrotising enterocolitis only
10 days after birth. She needed mechanical ventilation.
Laparotomy was performed with major bowel resection and
creation of a double-sided stoma.
Despite high caloric intake, partially parenterally, the girl
hardly gained weight, possibly due to high stomal output. A
small-intestine anastomosis was made, but shortly after, a
relaparotomy was needed because of a severely painful
bloated belly and abdominal wound leakage. The wound
was sealed but burst open again. After a repetition of this
event conservative treatment was given. The belly wound
stayed open.
The girl’s clinical condition deteriorated rapidly. Mechan-
ical ventilation had been reinitiated because of an acute
RDS and the high settings could not be decreased. Infections
were difficult to treat and enteral feeding was no option
anymore. At age 4 months the girl weighed 400 g more than
at birth, but this gain was mainly the result of oedema.
Gradually, the medical team came to realise that further
treatment offered no chance of survival: the open belly and
other complications would not recover and would cause her
death in the near future. The medical team felt that life-
sustaining treatment should be withdrawn, because pro-
longing would harm the girl.
When the doctors discussed their opinion with the parents
and asked for their explicit consent, the parents explained that
because of their Islamic religious beliefs, they would not
consent to this strategy. Explanation of the team’s motives in
terms of “nonmaleficence” and “respect for autonomy”, two
of the ‘four principles of biomedical ethics’, evoked resistance
from the parents. The conversation resulted in a conflict,
which could only be solved through the agency of an external
paediatrician: the parents agreed to respect his second opinion
and did not raise objections at the time this opinion turned out
to be similar to the one made by their own medical team.
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